Abstract. The BB84 protocol is used by Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver) to settle on a secret classical bit-string by communicating qubits over an insecure quantum channel where Eve (the Eavesdropper) can have access. In this paper, we revisit a well known eavesdropping technique against BB84. We claim that there exist certain gaps in understanding the existing eavesdropping strategy in terms of cryptanalytic view and we try to bridge those gaps in this paper.
Introduction
Establishing a common secret key between two parties at a distance is a prerequisite for executing a symmetric key cryptographic protocol between them. The seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman [9] presents a nice idea in this direction using the Discrete Logarithm problem. However, the pioneering work of Shor [17] showed that the key distribution [9] as well as the public key crypto-systems like RSA [16] and ECC [11] are not secure in the quantum computing model. On the other hand, there are lattice and coding theory based public key algorithms [4] that are believed to be secure in the quantum computing model and these are the main focus in the domain of post-quantum cryptography. However, these algorithms are quite complex and considerable works are going on for efficient implementation of such schemes on low end devices. In this regard, it is notable that provably secure quantum key distribution protocols exist and amongst them BB84 [1] is the first and the most cited one. It has not only been verified experimentally [3] in laboratory, but now-a-days some companies are manufacturing devices [15] to implement this protocol. In this scenario, it is important to study various eavesdropping models for these protocols and this is the motivation for our current work.
The famous BB84 protocol [1] relies on the conjugate bases Z = {|0 , |1 } and X = {|+ , |− }, where |+ = . Alice randomly selects one of the two orthogonal bases and encodes 0 and 1 respectively by a qubit prepared in one of the two states in each base. To be specific, Alice encodes 0 to |0 or |+ , and 1 to |1 or |− , depending on the chosen basis Z or X respectively. Bob measures the qubits one by one, randomly selecting the basis from the same set of bases. After the measurement, Alice and Bob publicly announce the sequence of bases used by them and discard the bases that do not match. They identify the sequence of bits corresponding to the bases that match and the resulting bit string, followed by error correction and privacy amplification [2] , becomes the common secret key. (ı = √ −1) along with the above two to show that the BB84 protocol with three conjugate bases (six-state protocol) provides improved security. Bruß had also shown that for the six-state protocol, the mutual information between Alice (the sender) and Eve (the eavesdropper) is higher when two-bit probe is used compared to the one-bit probe and hence provides a stronger eavesdropping strategy. In this paper, we revisit the problem towards a critical and concrete analysis in terms of Eve's success probability in guessing the qubits that Alice has sent.
The security of the BB84 protocol is based on the fact that if one wants to distinguish two non-orthogonal quantum states, then obtaining any information is only possible at the expense of introducing disturbance in the state(s). There are several works in the literature, e.g., [6, 7, 10] , that studied the relationship between "the amount of information obtained by Eve" and "the amount of disturbance created on the qubits that Bob receives from Alice". There are also several models for analysis of these problems. As example, Eve can work on each individual qubit as opposed to a set of qubits studied together. While the first one is called the incoherent attack [10] , the second one is known as the coherent attack [7] . In this paper, we study the incoherent attack.
Another interesting issue in specifying the eavesdropping scenario is whether there will be equal error probability at Bob's end corresponding to different bases. If this is indeed equal, then we call it symmetric and that is what we concentrate on here. It creates certain constraint on Eve in terms of extracting information from the communicated qubits, as the disturbance created on the qubits that Bob receives should be equal for all the bases. That is, as far as Alice and Bob are concerned, the interference by Eve will produce a binary symmetric channel between them, with an error probability that we will denote by D. There is also another model where this is not equal and then we call the eavesdropping model as asymmetric. Different error rates for different bases would be a clear indication to Alice and Bob that an eavesdropper (Eve) is interfering in the communication line. One may refer to [7] for details on this and it has been commented in the same paper that given any asymmetric attack (coherent or incoherent), one can always get a symmetric attack that can match the results of the non-symmetric strategy.
In both [10, 6] , the security of BB84 is analyzed in terms of the mutual information between Alice and Eve. When measuring her probe, Eve has two choices. One option is that she measures both her qubits -this is referred as a twobit probe. Alternatively, she can either measure only one of her two qubits [5, 6] or may interact with one qubit at her disposal -both of these lead to identical results and therefore we refer any one of them as one-bit probe. In [6] , it was claimed that the eavesdropping using the two-bit probe provides identical information to Eve using the one-bit probe in case of four-state protocol; however, for the six-state protocol, the two-bit probe leaks more information to Eve than the one-bit probe.
Organization of the Paper
In Section 2, we revisit the background material in detail. Sections 3 and 4 contain our main contributions. We re-examine the security in the light of Eve's success probability of guessing what was sent by Alice. In practice, Eve's goal is to determine the secret key bits that Alice sends to Bob. Eve's individual probes and hence individual guesses are independent. After measurement of the i-th probe, Eve makes a guess of the i-th secret key bit, i.e., she has to decide whether the i-th bit was 0 or 1. If her decided bit matches with what Alice has sent, then we call it a success, else it is an error. Eve's strategy would be to minimize the error probability in her guess, i.e., to maximize the success probability.
The mutual information between Alice and Eve gives a theoretical measure about the average information contained in the random variable associated with one of them about the random variable associated with the other. However, from the point of view of guessing the secret key established between Alice and Bob, Eve's success probability is a more practical parameter of cryptanalytic interest than the mutual information between Alice and Eve. The difference between the attacker's success probability and the probability of random guess (in this case, the probability of random guess is 1 2 ) gives the attacker's advantage. In Section 3, we present an analysis of the success probabilities of the fourstate and the six-state protocols and show that there is no extra advantage of the two-bit probe over the one-bit probe in the six-state protocol. We show that these two probes do not differ in terms of success probability of Eve's guess about the bits sent by Alice, though the mutual information is different.
In Section 4, we propose a multi-round version of the BB84 protocol. Using this strategy, Alice and Bob can decrease Eve's advantage. Though the concept is similar to privacy amplification [2] , we study the multi-round communication as part of the key distribution steps from a different viewpoint as follows. Both in the traditional 4-state BB84 protocol [1] and in the six-state one [6] , Bob measures first and then Alice publishes the bases she used. Thus, while the sixstate protocol is more secure than the four-state one, the disadvantage of the six-state scheme is that, on an average, only one-third of the qubits are kept and the rest two-third are discarded, which is worse than in the case of fourstate scheme, where half of the received qubits are discarded. Hence, for a fair comparison between our multi-round versions of these two protocols, we must ensure that the same number of qubits communicated between Alice and Bob and in the end, the secret keys established are of the same bit length. In this setting, we critically evaluate the security parameters of both the protocols.
2 Review of Optimal Eavesdropping [6, 10] In this part, we study a generic version of BB84 with the bases {|0 , |1 } and {|ψ , |ψ ⊥ }, where |ψ = a|0 + b|1 and |ψ ⊥ = b * |0 − a * |1 . We characterize the values of a, b based on the eavesdropping model presented in [6, 10] . We take each of a, b nonzero, as otherwise both the base will coincide (up to rotation). It is also trivial to see that |a| 2 + |b| 2 = 1 from normality condition. Under the symmetric incoherent optimal eavesdropping strategy [6, 10] , we get certain constraints on a, b as given in Theorem 1 in the next section. If one takes a state |ψ such that the conditions on a, b as given in Theorem 1 are not admitted, then the symmetric attack of [10] needs to be modified properly.
Following [19] , let {|φ i |i = 1, . . . , N } and {|Φ i |i = 1, . . . , N } be two orthonormal bases for an N dimensional Hilbert space. Such a pair of bases will be called conjugate, if and only if | φ i |Φ j | 2 = 1 N for any i, j. Here φ i |Φ j is the inner product between |φ i , |Φ j . The case N = 2 is considered here. The analysis with non-conjugate bases has been presented by Phoenix [13] and it has been shown that the original proposal of [1] using the conjugate bases provides the optimal security.
In the absence of eavesdropper or any channel noise, Bob exactly knows the state that has been sent by Alice, if measured in the correct basis. However, Eve's interaction does not allow that to happen. Consider the scenario when Alice sends one of two orthogonal states |ψ and |ψ ⊥ to Bob and Eve has her own initial two-qubit state |W . Eve's interaction with the state being sent from Alice to Bob can be modeled as the action of a unitary operator U on three qubits as follows.
Thus, when Alice sends |ψ (respectively |ψ ⊥ ), then Bob receives |ψ (respectively |ψ ⊥ ) with probability F ′ (this is called fidelity) and receives |ψ ⊥ (respectively |ψ ) with probability D ′ (this is called disturbance). 11 cannot be orthogonal and Eve has to decide the relationship among these 2-qubit states for optimal eavesdropping strategy. Now let us consider the case for the {|0 , |1 } basis.
The case for the generalized basis {|ψ , |ψ ⊥ } has already been expressed in (1).
As we are studying the symmetric attack here, we consider that the fidelity F and the disturbance D are same for all the cases, i.e., F = F ′ and D = D ′ . We have considered |ψ = a|0 + b|1 and |ψ ⊥ = b * |0 − a * |1 , where a, b are nonzero. Hence, by linearity and then using Equation (2), we get
Substituting |ψ = a|0 + b|1 and |ψ ⊥ = b * |0 − a * |1 in the first one of Equation (1), we obtain
). (4) Equating the right hand sides of Equations (3) and (4), we get
Similarly, comparing two different expressions for U (|ψ ⊥ , |W ), we get
As explained in [10, 7] , for a symmetric attack, we have the following constraints.
(i) The scalar products E ij |E kl and E
. This assumption implies that all the inner products must be real.
(ii) Any element of {|E 00 , |E 11 } is orthogonal to any element of {|E 01 , |E 10 }.
Similar orthogonality condition holds between the pairs {|E ′ 00 , |E
where x, y are real. It is evident that all the other inner products are zero due to the orthogonality conditions.
We have E ′ 00 |E ′ 01 = 0 and replacing them as in (5) and (6), we get
From (9) we get the following
The expression of D in (10) is not defined when the denominator is zero. Given y = 0, the denominator of (10) 
Now consider the case when denominator of D in (10) is not zero. It has already been considered that E ′ 00 |E ′ 10 = 0. Now replacing them as in (5) and (7) and plugging in the value of D from (10), we get (1 − x)y a 2 b * 2 − a * 2 b 2 = 0. We have considered that E 00 |E 11 = E ′ 00 |E ′ 11 = x, and E 01 |E 10 = E ′ 01 |E ′ 10 = y, where both x, y are real. Thus, it is natural to consider that 0 < x, y < 1; otherwise, the vectors will be either orthogonal or the same. In such a situation, from
i.e., ab * = ±a * b. This holds if and only if a = ±rb, ±ırb, where r = |a| |b| = 1. The r = 1 case has already been taken care of.
For r = 1, when we put a = ±rb in (10), we get D = 1−x 2−x+y , as given in (11) already. Now taking the inner product of both sides of (6) and (7) and putting
2 2 y which has been assumed to be y. Thus, (b * ) 2 + (a * ) 2 2 = 1, and given a = ±rb, we obtain either both a, b are real of both a, b are imaginary.
However, for r = 1, if we put a = ±ırb in (10), we get D = 1−x 2−x−y as in (12) . Then following the similar manner as before, we get one of a, b is real and the other one is imaginary. Thus we have the following result. Theorem 1 identifies that for such eavesdropping where BB84 protocol is implemented with the bases |0 , |1 and |ψ , |ψ ⊥ , the form of |ψ is restricted given 0 < x, y < 1. When r = 1, then the bases |0 , |1 and |ψ , |ψ ⊥ cannot be conjugate. To have conjugate bases, one must take r = 1, i.e., |a| = |b| = 1 √ 2
. As the simplest example, it is natural to consider
, which gives |ψ = |0 +|1 √ 2
and
that has indeed been used in BB84 protocol [1] . On such conjugate bases, the eavesdropping idea of [10] works that we discuss in the next section.
In [10] , the conjugate bases |0 , |1 and
2−x+y , as in Equation (11). In [6] , three conjugate bases |0 , |1 ; 
However, there are complex numbers a, b, where
, but a = ±b, ±ıb and in those case a, b are not as given in Theorem 1. As example, one can take, |ψ =
. Symmetric attack in the attack model of [6, 10] is not directly possible in these cases when y is nonzero. However, if Eve uses a phase-covariant cloner or orients her probes appropriately, then she can mount the same attack. Thus, by no choice of a, b, Alice and Bob can avoid the symmetric attack on the four-state protocol.
Eavesdropper's Success Probability as a Function of Disturbance at Receiver End
In this part, we critically revisit the attack models of [10] and [6] in the light of success probability of Eve's guess about the qubit that was actually sent by Alice. In the analysis, we require to compute the probabilities of different related events. These probabilities form the components for the mutual information between Alice and Eve as well as the success probability for Eve's guess. First in Section 3.1, we compute these individual probabilities and for the sake of completeness show the calculation of mutual information also. Next in Section 3.2, we derive the success probabilities of Eve's guess for various cases and discuss how they give different insight from mutual information.
We introduce a few notations for the sake of our analysis. Let A, B, V be the random variables corresponding to the bit sent by Alice, the bit received by Bob and the outcome observed by Eve due to her measurement. Eve performs the measurement after Alice and Bob announce their bases. After the announcement, Eve discards the probes corresponding to the qubits for which Alice and Bob's bases do not match and works with the probes corresponding to the bases that match. For one-bit probe, Eve measures her second qubit in the bases Z or X, as used by Alice. Similarly, for two-bit probe, Eve measures in the bases {|00 , |01 , |10 , |11 } when Alice and Bob use the Z basis and she measures in the basis {| + + , | + − , | − + , | − − } when Alice and Bob use the X basis. In this paper, we calculate all probabilities considering the Z basis only. Symmetry gives the same results when the X basis is used. Hence, without loss of generality, V can be assumed to be in {0, 1} for one-bit probe, and it can be assumed to be in {00, 01, 10, 11} for two-bit probe. In the subsequent discussion, we use the term Eve's observation to denote the observed outcome V of her measurement.
Probability Analysis and Mutual Information
We follow the standard definitions of mutual information and conditional entropy from information theory [8] . The mutual information between Alice and Bob is given by
and the mutual information between Alice and Eve is given by
where H(·) is the Shannon entropy function. We assume that Alice randomly generates the bits to be transmitted, so that P (A = 0) = P (A = 1) = 
. So from Equation (14) we have
Recall that (one may refer to Section 2 for details) the general unitary transformation designed by Eve is as follows:
. (17) Again, the likelihoods P (V = v | A = i) are computed as
After the announcement of the bases in the BB84 protocol, Eve measures her qubit in the corresponding bases. The likelihoods for the attack in [10] when computed using Equation (18) turns out to be as shown in Table 1 below.
for the attack model of [10] .
, say. Note that since P (A = 0) = P (A = 1) = 1 2 , the half of the sum of each column in Table 1 gives the marginal probability of V for that column. In Equation (17) , putting the value of P (V = v | A = i) from Table 1 , we find that the posteriors are identical with the corresponding likelihoods. Hence
Also, from Table 1 , we have P (V = 0) = P (V = 1) =
. Substituting in Equation (15), we have
Note that the above computation is shown assuming a one-bit probe. It is easy to show that, for the four-state protocol, the one-bit and the two-bit probes give identical mutual information between Alice and Eve. The expression for this mutual information is given by Equation (19) which matches with [10, Equation 65 ]. Next, the interactions of [6, Equations 9-15], when expressed in our notations, become |E 00 = β|10 + 1 − |β| 2 |01 , |E 01 = |00 , |E 10 = |11 , and |E 11 = 1 − |β| 2 |10 + β|01 . From Equation (13) (Section 2), we obtain, D = 1−x 2−x , which gives, x = 1−2D 1−D . Noting that, x = E 00 |E 11 , we get
Technically, the square-root in Equation (20) should be written with a ± sign. However, for simplicity, we show all calculation with the + sign here. The calculation with the − sign would be similar. Table 2 . Values of P (V = v | A = i) = P (A = i | V = v) for one-bit probe of [6] . Table 3 . Values of P (V = v | A = i) for two-bit probe of [6] .
For one-bit probe, the likelihoods for [6] when computed using Equation (18) turns out to be as shown in Table 2 .
From Equation (17), we find that in this case also, the posteriors are identical with the corresponding likelihoods.
For ease of calculation, let us denote
V = 00 V = 01 V = 10 V = 11 Table 4 . Values of P (A = i | V = v) for two-bit probe of [6] . Table 2 , we have f 1 (D) ). Substituting in Equation (15), we have
This expression matches with [6, Equation 18 ]. Now, consider the two-bit probe. The likelihoods for [6] when computed using Equation (18) turns out to be as shown in Table 3 .
From Equation (17), the posteriors are computed as given in Table 4 . Hence
Substituting in Equation (15), we have 
< I
AV holds. From this, it is concluded in [6] that the six-state protocol is more secure than the four-state protocol. Moreover, within the six-state protocol, two-bit probe helps Eve in obtaining more mutual information than the one-bit probe. However, we present a different view on both of these claims.
Optimal Success Probability and Its Implications
We introduce a few relevant definitions first and then proceed with the analysis. Thus, the conditional error probability of Eve is given by P (error | V = v) = P (S(v) = A | V = v) and the error probability of Eve is given by
The success probability of Eve is given by P (success) = 1 − P (error).
Definition 4.
If P (success) is the success probability of the Eavesdropper in guessing the bit sent by Alice through some strategy S, and P (prior) is the probability denoting the Eavesdropper's prior knowledge about the bit sent by Alice before applying any strategy, then the advantage of the Eavesdropper for the particular strategy is defined as A(D) = |P (success) − P (prior)| .
Since Alice chooses the bit to be sent uniformly at random over {0, 1}, in our case P (prior) = . Maximizing the success probability or the advantage is equivalent to minimizing the error probability. Note that Eve's success or error probability is a feature of the particular strategy devised by Eve. Her goal is to choose the best possible strategy in determining the secret key.
Definition 5. Out of all possible strategies, the one giving the maximum success probability or the minimum error probability, is called the optimal strategy S opt . The corresponding success (or error) probability is called the optimal success (or error) probability of the Eavesdropper and the corresponding advantage is called the optimal advantage of the Eavesdropper.
In the result below, we formulate how Eve can decide the optimal strategy. Theorem 2. The optimal strategy is given by
and the corresponding optimal success probability is given by
where the notation argmax i denotes the particular value i opt of the argument i which maximizes the above conditional probability across all values i.
Proof. Since P (V = v) is independent of the strategy S, an optimum strategy that minimizes P (error) must minimize P (S(v) = A | V = v) for each v, as per Equation (24). In other words, for each v, it should maximize P (S(v) = A | V = v). This means that S(v) should produce a guess i ∈ {0, 1} for which P (A = i|V = v) is maximum. For the particular observation v, denote this optimal value of i by i opt (v). With this optimal strategy the optimal error probability turns out to be P opt (error)
and the optimal success probability becomes
Hence the result follows.
⊓ ⊔
Since P (A = 0) = P (A = 1) = 1 2 , if we multiply each likelihood in Tables 1, 2  and 3 by   1 2 , we get the corresponding joint probabilities P (A = i, V = v)'s and the optimal success probability is given by summing the maximum joint probability (corresponding to the row i opt (v)) for each column v.
Thus, for the attack model of [10] , the optimal success probability is computed from Table 1 as
It can be easily shown that, like the mutual information, the success probabilities are also the same in both the probes (one-bit and two-bit) for the four-state protocol.
Since the six-state protocol [6] has different mutual information between Alice and Eve for the one-bit and the two-bit probes, one may be tempted to conclude that Eve has different success probabilities in these two probes. However, we are going to show that this is not the case. In spite of having different mutual information, both the probes lead to the same success probability for the sixstate protocol.
For the one-bit probe of the six-state protocol [6] , the optimal success probability is computed from Table 2 as
Note that in the above derivation, we have used the fact that
as per Equation (21). For the two-bit probe of [6] , the optimal success probability is computed from Table 3 as
Note that in the above derivation, we have used the fact that (1 − D)|β| In Figure 1 , we plot (as functions of the disturbance D) the optimal mutual information between Alice and Eve (on the left) and the optimal success probability of Eve's guess (on the right).
As an illustrative example, we show the values of the probabilities for D = 1 6 in Table 5 . The optimal success probability in one-bit probe is given by Table 5 .
for both one-and two-bit probes of [6] . According to Definition 4, the optimal advantages of the eavesdropper in the four-state and in the six-state protocols are respectively given by
(28)
Thus, though Eve has more mutual information in the two-bit probe, that does not give any extra cryptographic advantage in guessing the bit sent by Alice. So from the point of view of cryptanalysis, both the one-bit probe and two-bit probe are equivalent even in the six-state BB84.
Comparing Four and Six-State Protocols Considering Same Number of Qubits
For BB84 with four states, on average half of the qubits communicated by Alice to Bob is discarded due to mismatch in their bases. For the six-state protocol, the expected number of discarded qubits is two-third of the total number of qubits communicated. So for a fair comparison, we must take the same values of 1. the length of the secret key established, and 2. the total number of qubits communicated in both the protocols. To establish a secret key of length n bits, the four-state protocol must communicate around 4n qubits (in the practical scenario, the exact number is little more than 4n) and the six-state protocol must communicate around 6n qubits (practically little more than that). Therefore, in order to match the total number of bits communicated, the four-state protocol may be repeated 3t times and the six-states protocol should be repeated 2t times for any positive integer t.
With the above motivation, we define a variant of BB84, called m-BB84 in Table 6 . In this protocol, Alice and Bob establish m different keys of the same length by running m independent instances of BB84 and finally establish the actual secret key by bitwise XOR-ing the individual keys together. The main idea behind this scheme is the fact that when several biased bits are XORed together, the bias in the XOR output bit becomes smaller than the bias of each bit. The concept is in the direction to privacy amplification [2] . However, the motivation here is to compare the four-state and six-state protocol under the same footage. Any post-processing including privacy amplification can be performed on the string produced by the multi-round BB84.
The bias in K j , the j-th bit of the final key K, depends on the biases in the j-th bits of the individual keys. We can use the Piling-up Lemma [18] stated below to compute the bias in K j . We present the proof also for the sake of completeness.
Protocol m-BB84 1. Alice and Bob run m independent instances of BB84. (The instances may either be run sequentially, or they may be run in parallel through separate channels). 2. Suppose they establish m many n-bit secret keys, namely, k1, k2, . . . , km. Let ki,j be the j-th bit of the key ki established in the i-th instance of BB84, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. 3. The j-th bit of the final secret key K is given by Kj = k1,j ⊕ k2,j ⊕ · · · ⊕ km,j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Table 6 . Multi-round BB84 Protocol with parameter (number of rounds) m.
Lemma 1 (Piling-up Lemma). Let ǫ i be the bias in the binary random variable X i , i = 1, 2, . . . , m, i.e., P (X i = 0) = Proof. The result trivially holds for m = 1. For m = 2, we have
and hence the bias is 2 2−1 ǫ 1 ǫ 2 . Assume that the result holds for m = ℓ, i.e., the bias in XOR of ℓ variables is given by δ = 2 ℓ−1 ǫ 1 ǫ 2 . . . ǫ l . Now, for k = ℓ + 1, taking Y = X 1 ⊕ X 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ X ℓ , we can apply the result for k = 2 to obtain the bias in Y ⊕ X ℓ+1 as 2δǫ ℓ+1 = 2 ℓ ǫ 1 ǫ 2 . . . ǫ ℓ+1 . Hence, by induction, the result holds for any m.
⊓ ⊔ Now, we can formulate the optimal advantage of the adversary for m-BB84 as follows. Proof. For any bit position j, the computation of the bias follows in the same manner. Hence, without loss of generality, fix a bit position j. Corresponding to this position, there are m key bits, each having the same bias ǫ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The value of this bias is given by Equation (28) for the four-state protocol and by Equation (29) for the six-state protocol. By substituting these expressions for ǫ i in Lemma 1, the result follows.
⊓ ⊔ Note that Equations (28) and (29) can be considered as special cases of Theorem 4 with m = 1, i.e., they represent A 4 (D, 1) and A 6 (D, 1) respectively.
In principle, the higher the value of m, the greater is the reduction of Eve's advantage. However, one should keep in mind that with increasing m, the effective disturbance perceived by Bob also increases. We can formulate this by the following result. given by 1 − s.
⊓ ⊔
As discussed already, for fair comparison we should always compare fourstate 3t-BB84 with six-state 2t-BB84 for any fixed integral value of t. Because of Theorem 5, higher t means more error for Alice and Bob. Hence, we would restrict our subsequent discussion for t = 1, i.e, we would compare the four-state 3-BB84 with the six-state 2-BB84, though in principle similar comparison holds for any t.
We consider three scenarios for our comparative study. Let D 4 and D 6 denote the disturbances in each qubit of the individual instances of the four and the sixstate protocols respectively. For comparison in equal footing, we take D 6 = D and express all the other quantities in terms of D. D, 1) . That is, the eavesdropper can obtain more information in the traditional 4-state BB84 [1] than the 6-state modification [6] . However, we note that A 4 (D, 3) ≤ A 6 (D, 2) for D ≤ 0.27 (up to two decimal places). Thus, at the expense of same number of qubits, for the range of disturbance ≤ 0.27, the fourstate BB84 is more secure (as eavesdropper obtains less information) than the six-state BB84 in the model we discussed above. But this greater security comes at the cost of greater effective disturbance at Bob's end, as depicted by the plot.
As a numerical example, consider D = 0.1. Then A 4 (D, 1) = 0.3, which is more than A 6 (D, 1) = 0.2562. Again, A 4 (D, 3) = 0.108, which is less than A 6 (D, 2) = 0.1312, implying that the four-state 3-BB84 is more secure. However, 
Conclusion
In this paper, we revisit the symmetric incoherent eavesdropping strategy of Fuchs et al. [10] and Bruß [6] on the four and the six-state BB84 protocols respectively in the light of the success probability of Eve. We show that both the one-bit and the two-bit probes in the six-state have the same success probability for Eve. Further, we critically compare the security issues in the four and the six-state protocols when same number of qubits are used in both the cases. Though the theoretical results of [6] as well as ours are correct, our results are placed from the cryptanalytic viewpoint of optimal eavesdropping and thus the interpretation is different from what claimed in [6] .
